When We Were First Paid 
The Blackfoot Treaty, The Western Tribes, And
The Creation Of The Common Hunting Ground, 1855 by Farr, William E.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Great Plains Quarterly Great Plains Studies, Center for 
Spring 2001 
"When We Were First Paid" The Blackfoot Treaty, The Western 
Tribes, And The Creation Of The Common Hunting Ground, 1855 
William E. Farr 
University of Montana, farr@crmw.org 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly 
 Part of the Other International and Area Studies Commons 
Farr, William E., ""When We Were First Paid" The Blackfoot Treaty, The Western Tribes, And The Creation Of 
The Common Hunting Ground, 1855" (2001). Great Plains Quarterly. 2226. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/2226 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
"WHEN WE WERE FIRST PAID" 
THE BLACKFOOT TREATY, THE WESTERN TRIBES, AND 
THE CREATION OF THE COMMON HUNTING GROUND, 1855 
WILLIAM E. FARR 
In mid-October of 1855, Blackfoot Treaty 
commissioner Isaac 1. Stevens, governor of 
Washington Territory and ex-officio its su-
perintendent of Indian Affairs, and his co-
commissioner Colonel Alfred Cumming, head 
of the Central Superintendency including Ne-
braska Territory, finally assembled the Black-
foot Peace Council just below the confluence 
of the Judith and Missouri Rivers. The federal 
government through the Office of Indian Af-
fairs by then had already pieced together a 
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new reservation policy for the West. This "new 
order of things," largely designed by Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny, 
hoped to reduce white conflicts with Indians, 
to prevent, if possible, expensive military ac-
tions, and above all to extinguish Indian land 
title by purchase, thereby enabling "legitimate" 
white settlement. In doing so, the new policy 
went well beyond the government's earlier and 
more limited goals of keeping immigrant trails 
free of hostile Indians and of creating a peace-
ful, federal dispensation or order on the Great 
Plains by means of annual compensation.! 
The Blackfoot Council and the treaty that 
emerged from it, often termed Lame Bull's 
Treaty, however, did not fit the new reserva-
tion policy. It extinguished no aboriginal land 
title through land sales or cessions, nor did it 
provide for Indian removal to reservations 
where the government could establish schools, 
hospitals, and mills and provide farming in-
struction and moral guidance. Nor did the 
treaty advance the division of communal lands 
in order to allot small parcels to individual 
Indians. It was not a so-called land treaty at 
all; it was a peace treaty. And it contained a 
surprise-the federal creation of a common 
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FIG. 1. Isaac Ingalls Stevens (1818-1862). First 
Governor of Washington Territory and Commissioner 
at the Blackfoot Treaty. Courtesy of K. Ross Toole 
Archives, The University of Montana. 
hunting ground. This designated area was to 
be shared "in peace" by the Blackfoot tribes 
and what were termed the "Western Indians," 
those who had come from west of the Rocky 
Mountains, across the continental divide, from 
the drainages of the Columbia River. These 
Western Indians were the Nez Perce, Yakima, 
Walla Walla, Cayuse, Kootenai, Spokane, and 
numerous Salish speakers, most prominently 
the Flathead and the Pend d'Oreille. 
The formal establishment of such a com-
mon hunting ground in October of 1855 flew 
in the face of much of the emergent reserva-
tion policy. Instead of being encouraged to 
establish fixed and permanent homes, namely 
reservations, for exclusive tribal use, and to 
stay put, Stevens's federal recognition and for-
mal establishment of a "buffalo commons" 
stimulated the bison hunters of the Columbia 
River drainages to continue their long, sea-
sonal migrations to the contested buffalo plains 
FIG. 2. Col. Alfred Cumming, Commissioner at 
the Blackfoot Treaty. Drawing by Gustavus Sohon . 
Courtesy of Washington State Historical Society, 
Tacoma. 
centered at the headwaters of the Missouri 
and Yellowstone Rivers just as they had al-
ways done. 
Where did the Blackfoot Treaty commis-
sioners find the precedent for such a common 
hunting ground and what lay behind their 
willingness to establish it on the buffalo plains? 
Could this divergent, if not contradictory, re-
gional determination in the Far West be rec-
onciled with the prevailing federal reservation 
policy as determined by the Office of Indian 
Affairs? Or was that unnecessary, given that 
American reservation policy in the 1850s was 
by its nature contradictory, little more than a 
series of regional improvisations?2 
Commissioners Stevens and Cumming, of 
course, did not actually "create" the common 
hunting ground. They simply acknowledged 
and restructured the reality of a preexisting 
Indian common hunting ground, a sort of buf-
falo commons, that gradually over the years 
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Fig. 3. "Blackfoot Council - 1855." Drawing by Gustavus Sohon. Courtesy of Washington State Historical 
Society, Tacoma. 
had been constructed through war, treaties, 
and diplomacy on the part of the tribes them-
selves. Stevens had first encountered this dy-
namic tribal creation with its shifting 
boundaries and alliances when he led a con-
gressionally funded transcontinental railroad 
survey through the middle of Blackfoot terri-
tory in 1853. Two years later, not only did 
treaty commissioners Stevens and Cumming 
recognize this Indian construction in the treaty 
provisions in 1855, they gave it an inordinate 
amount of attention. What were their goals 
and expectations regarding the federal defini-
tion, limitation, and reshaping of this preex-
isting regional Indian commons? How did these 
purposes relate to possible repercussions for a 
bison population, already perceived to be dwin-
dling on the Northern Plains? 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Long before Lewis and Clark wrote of the 
Cakahlarishkit, or the river of the road to 
buffalo, in July of 1806, Indian tribes west of 
the Rocky Mountains had crossed the conti-
nental divide on their way to hunt buffalo on 
the open plains of the upper Missouri, 
Yellowstone, and Musselshell Rivers. There, 
Western Indians from the distant reaches of 
the Columbia Plateau and the tangle of moun-
tain ranges that would become Idaho and west-
ern Montana seasonally competed with a 
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FIG. 4. Map showing the Territory of the Blackfeet and the common Hunting Ground of the Blackfeet and 
Western Indians as established by the Treaty at the mouth of the Judith, 17 October 1855. Courtesy of National 
Archives, Records of Bureau of Indian Affairs, RG75, Microcopy T-494, Roll 5, Frame 1093. 
welter of Plains people for hunting access to 
the immense herds of buffalo. The most im-
portant of these Plains tribes were those of the 
Blackfoot Confederacy, consisting primarily 
of Blood, Blackfeet proper, and Piegan, along 
with their allies, the Gros Ventres, and the 
Crow, Sioux, and Cree.} In the hunting par-
lance of the nineteenth century this was called 
"going to buffalo." It would be for many of the 
Western Indians a right and a passion essen-
tial to their culture and one they swore never 
to give Up.4 
While Indian initiative to "go to buffalo" 
would always remain decisive, Governor 
Stevens's 1855 signature treaty solutions in 
Washington Territory also came to playa sig-
nificant role. In these treaties Stevens formally 
recognized the right of the Western Indians to 
continue to "go to buffalo" from their newly 
established reservations, and with this right, 
the de facto existence of a buffalo common 
hunting ground on the plains of what would 
become Montana. Both acknowledgments 
encouraged a more active interest in buffalo 
hunting and an even greater Western tribal 
presence east of the Rockies. 
The evidence for a buffalo hunting com-
mons, where rival tribal entities and bands 
hunted, clashed, allied, socialized, and traded 
on the Upper Missouri and Yellowstone drain-
ages, is remarkably rich throughout the nine-
teenth century. As early as in the journals of 
Lewis and Clark it was amply documented. In 
fact, not only was it recognized, but William 
Clark linked the existence of such a war zone 
or no-man's-land to the unusual abundance of 
big game populations, especially bison, that 
the Corps of Discovery encountered there. s 
This phenomenon of a contested ground, 
shared in common by a number of tribes, was 
also attested to by the German physician F. A. 
Wislizenus. In 1839 he remarked that buffalo-
hunting Indians "recognize certain districts, 
where buffalo usually abound, as common 
hunting and war ground." There the various 
tribes "roam at will, subjecting their conflict-
ing rights to the test of strength. Between the 
tribes there is perpetual warfare."6 
While portions of the Western Indians had 
always gone to buffalo, they did so in increas-
ing numbers after the arrival of the horse. Buf-
falo hunting became a regular activity and 
could not be stopped. Both Francois Larocque 
in his journal of 1805 and Ross Cox puzzled 
over this preoccupation to go each fall to "the 
fork of the Missouri or there about to kill Buf-
faloes," and both concluded that the only rea-
son they could discern for the Western Indians' 
willingness to fight constant and losing battles 
with the Blackfeet and other tribes on the east 
side of the Rocky Mountains was their love of 
the buffalo.7 The journals of David Thompson 
and Alexander Henry the Younger reinforce 
this view and are replete with references to 
the numerous alliances the Western tribes 
constructed in order to compete with the more 
numerous and dominating Blackfeet. In the 
1840s Father Nicolas Point, who traveled with 
the Flathead and Pend d'Oreille on their an-
nual winter hunting expeditions to the com-
mon hunting ground, related other firsthand 
examples of bloodshed, peace delegations, 
horse raids, truces, trading, and hospitality. 
There existed, then, an ongoing "bison diplo-
macy" between the contending if unequal 
tribes that was vibranr, intensely dynamic, and 
nothing like the picture of unremitting and 
unrelieved warfare so often portrayed. 
By the time Governor Stevens reached Fort 
Owen in the Bitterroot Valley in 1853, he 
knew from his own experience that the West-
ern Indians, as well as the Blackfeet, Crow, 
and Shoshoni, all hunted bison around the 
Three Forks of the Missouri, the Musselshell, 
and the upper Yellowstone country . Two years 
later at the Walla Walla Council in 1855 he 
told the Yakima and Nez Perce, "I have met 
you in the trail. I saw your people in buffalo 
country. I met your people on the road to buf-
falo country."8 He knew as well from numer-
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ous personal conversations that each of these 
tribal enrities maintained that it had done so 
since time immemorial. As a result of that 
personal experience, when Stevens had his 
1854 "Map Showing the Indian Tribes of 
Washington Territory and on the Missouri and 
its Tributaries" drawn up and submitted to 
Washington, D.C., he clearly identified this 
long-standing neutral territory that was occu-
pied at various times by all, but controlled by 
none, as "Common Hunting Grounds of the 
Blackfeet, Crows, and the Indians of Wash-
ington Territory." In Stevens's mind there was 
no question about its existence. 9 
By December 1854 and throughout the fol-
lowing winter and spring, Governor Stevens 
implemented a new federal reservation policy 
in western Washington Territory. He did so 
by means of a series of treaties in which he 
extinguished Indian aboriginal title and re-
moved the various tribes and consolidated frag-
ments to designated reservations. By May 1855 
Stevens had moved his treaty tour east of the 
Cascade Mountains. There, he and his Or-
egon counterpart, Governor Joel Palmer, con-
ducted at Walla Walla a treaty council with 
the Plateau tribes on both sides of the Colum-
bia River. Hoping to make the land sales more 
palatable, the two commissioners promised 
that not only would the treating tribes of Nez 
Perce, Yakima, Walla Walla, and Cayuse re-
ceive government compensation for their 
lands, but also they would be able to conrinue 
hunting, gathering, and fishing in the lands 
they had sold or ceded-as they had always 
done. Governor Palmer, attempting to sweeten 
the agreement, described the policy this way: 
"[W]e buy your country and pay you for it and 
give the most of it back to you again."l0 
As attractive as that proposal was, Stevens 
upped the ante by holding out the promise 
that those same off-reservation rights, exer-
cised in what was phrased "usual and accus-
tomed places," could be extended even beyond 
the claimed and then ceded territory in ques-
tion-in other words, even to the buffalo hunt-
ing ground beyond the Blue Mountains and 
beyond the Rocky Mountains, some 400 to 
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600 miles away from their newly designated 
reservations. This was a remarkable conces-
sion to local Plateau subsistence patterns. It 
was also a significant departure from Stevens's 
earlier treaties. Even more remarkable was 
Stevens's promise that the Columbia River 
tribes would be able to do this without having 
to constantly fear the harassment of Blackfoot 
raiders as in the past. With federal support, 
Stevens promised there would be equal access 
and intertribal peace on the buffalo hunting 
ground. 
We want you to have your roots and to get 
your berries, and to kill your game. We want 
you, if you wish, to mount your horses and 
to go to the Buffalo plains, and we want 
more; we want you to have peace there. ll 
With a pronounced flourish and knowing 
full well the predictable response, Stevens trot-
ted out a telling rhetorical question: who had 
been disturbing them on their way to buffalo, 
who had tried to keep them away from their 
hunting ground on the Missouri and Yellow-
stone, stolen their horses and murdered their 
men, women, and children'? Was it the whites? 
Of course not. The answer was clear to all-it 
was the Blackfeet. "We want that to cease 
forever," Stevens said. "If we can agree here, 
this you will be able to say to the Blackfeet 
and the Blackfeet will say 'We will be friends, 
we will chase the buffalo together on the plain, 
we will be friends forever.">[2 Stevens had al-
ready laid plans for formal federal recogni-
tion-and regulation-of the preexisting 
Indian common hunting ground, a recogni-
tion that only confirmed its existence and the 
entitlement, by prescriptive use, of the W est-
ern Indians to hunt there. 
Given these promises at Walla Walla, it 
was appropriate that in Stevens's next effort, 
the Hellgate Treaty with the Pend d'Oreille, 
Flathead, and Kootenai, he would repeat his 
pledges to establish an intertribal peace across 
the continental divide in buffalo country. Con-
ducted in July 1855 at the confluence of the 
Bitterroot and Clark Fork Rivers, Stevens told 
Victor, whom he had selected as head chief 
for the consolidated three tribes, that he ex-
pected to make "a treaty which will keep the 
Blackfeet out of this valley, and if that will 
not do it we will then have soldiers who will." 
He added that he had been directed to make 
this treaty by the President and that "we hope 
it will forever settle your troubles with the 
Blackfeet."13 "Going to buffalo" loomed large 
in the subsequent negotiations. It even affected 
the decision as to which valley west of the 
Continental Divide was the better choice for 
the site of the consolidated reservation-the 
Bitterroot favored by the Flathead or the Mis-
sion Valley selected by the Pend d'Oreille and 
the KootenaL l4 
The long-anticipated Blackfoot Peace 
Council was the final stop in Governor 
Stevens's ambitious treaty tour. Although 
scheduled for late September in Fort Benton, 
the council did not actually open until 16 
October. It had been put off as a result of 
numerous delays in transporting critical treaty 
goods up the Missouri. Even the venue had to 
be changed. Instead of Fort Benton, the com-
missioners and Indians met 100 miles down-
stream just below the mouth of the Judith River 
on the north bank amid the leafless, bare cot-
tonwoods. Here at the confluence of the two 
rivers, the Missouri and the Judith, called the 
Big River and Yellow River by the Blackfeet, 
Stevens made good his earlier promises to bring 
together the far-flung tribes and bands of the 
so-called Blackfoot Nation, the Nitzitapi, who 
straddled both sides of the forty-ninth paral-
lel from the Yellowstone River in the south 
to the Red Deer River in the north. IS He also 
brought to the Judith representatives of the 
Plateau and Mountain Indians from across 
the divide in Washington Territory, led by a 
strong, well-armed Nez Perce contingent and 
the various elements of the recently created 
Flathead N ation. 16 In addition, there was one 
Plains Cree chief, Broken Arm, already cele-
brated for his efforts at brokering peace be-
tween the Cree and the Blackfeet. Well 
traveled, Broken Arm had been to Washing-
ton, D.C., in 1831-32, and in 1851 he had 
attended the Fort Laramie Treaty Council 
where tribal boundaries on the Northern Plains 
were "discussed and mapped." Broken Arm, or 
Maskepetoon, came with the Piegan leader 
Little Dog bearing tobacco as a delegate for 
both the missing Cree and their frequent com-
panions, the Assiniboine.17 The Crow, too, 
were conspicuously absent, although not by 
design, as were Shoshoni elements. Even so, 
the eventual distribution of provisions on the 
treaty grounds indicated the presence of some 
3,295 Indians, who represented a total census 
of some 15,500. 18 
The treaty that emerged from this belated 
Blackfoot Council , because of its intent to-
ward peace, was something of a throwback to 
1851 and the Treaty of Laramie. Neither had 
as its purpose the sale or acquisition of Indian 
lands for white settlement or the extinguish-
ing of native land title. Nor did either treaty 
establish small, formal reservations of Indian 
land that were to become "fixed, permanent 
homes" for exclusive tribal use as required by 
the new policy coming from the Indian Of-
fice. 19 Instead, both aimed at establishing "per-
manent relations of peace and amity"- in the 
case of the Judith Treaty, between the various 
Blackfoot tribes "hunting and trading on 
American soil" and the US government. In 
addition, the Judith River council was to ini-
tiate intertribal peace between those same 
Blackfoot bands and tribes and their compet-
ing neighbors, with a special insistence upon 
peace with the Western Indians. 
The Blackfoot Council, like its earlier coun-
terpart for the "nations of the Prairie and 
Mountain Indians" at Fort Laramie, amounted 
to a federal attempt at establishing a peaceful 
dispensation on the Northern Plains. Peace 
was critical in Stevens's eyes. Two years be-
fore, with energy and great organizational skill, 
he led the Northern Railroad Exploration and 
Survey through the heart of Blackfoot coun-
try. For this northern route to be competitive 
with the other transcontinental railroad sur-
veys, Stevens felt he had to pacify the Blackfeet 
and their neighbors. Moreover, his newly cre-
ated Washington Territory was attracting im-
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FIG. 5. "The Broken Arm (Maske-pe-town) , Chief 
of the Cree Indians." Drawing by Gustavus Sohon. 
Courtesy of Washington State Historical Society, 
Tacoma. 
migrants and capital, and he had almost com-
pleted his task of clearing Indian title to most 
of the territory's lands, preparing them for 
extensive settlement. Consequently, when he 
later functioned as a Blackfoot Treaty com-
missioner, Stevens was determined to install 
the permanent peace his survey and Washing-
ton Territory required. 20 
Ensuring intertribal peace, in the view of 
the government and its two resident commis-
sioners, rested on two assumptions, both pre-
viously explored at Laramie. The first was 
compensation for Indian losses of game, grass, 
and wood; the second was the desirability of 
establishing carefully defined and designated 
tribal territories, with specific boundaries. 
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FIG. 6. "The Bloods Come in the Council, Blackfeet 
Camp, 1855." Drawing by Gustavus Sohon. Courtesy 
of'Washington State Historical Society, Tacoma. 
These were viewed by government officials as 
necessary steps in removing many of the causes 
of intertribal war on the buffalo plains. Both 
Stevens and Cumming would also insist upon 
what the Indians called "lines."21 
While the Laramie Treaty had asked tribal 
members to stay within their designated 
boundaries, it had not meant they were to "sur-
render the privilege of hunting, fishing or pass-
ing over any of the tracts of country herein 
before described."22 The Judith Treaty would 
not demand this either-as long as peace pre-
vailed. Nonetheless, both treaties promoted 
the idea that if the Indians remained in their 
own territories, intertribal peace would be 
easier to secure. Territorial segregation was 
the key. It would also allow federal authori-
ties, if need be, to identify Indian parties re-
sponsible for depredations, even pinpointing 
specific bands that ignored the commitments 
of tribal leaders and broke the peace. Building 
on this Laramie pattern, Stevens and Cumming 
also devised provisions for guaranteed rights-
of-way, the establishment of military forts, and 
the creation of telegraph installations. The 
idea in 1855 was to secure an American peace 
for this sprawling expanse of high plains, as 
previous negotiators at Laramie had done. 
But things had changed. A new federal res-
ervation policy in 1855 had replaced the Fort 
Laramie model. Stevens's own treaties, from 
Puget Sound to Hellgate, had reflected these 
changes and were certainly preferable, from 
the government's perspective, to the Laramie 
example. Nonetheless, Stevens and Cumming 
returned to the model of 1851, as it was sim-
ply too early to pursue the new reservation 
policy with the more nomadic bison hunters 
of the Northern Plains. This was especially so 
since no white settlement was contemplated. 
Consequently, the Indian Office addressed the 
problem of intertribal war and the growing 
threat of Indian-white hostilities by simply 
promoting peace and territorial segregation. 
Again, as at Laramie, the Indian Office held 
out the reward of government compensation. 
Indemnification would make up for the In-
dian losses of large amounts of grass and 
timber and for the ever-declining game popu-
lations occasioned by white expansion.23 
Had the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty dealt 
with all tribal lands south of the forty-ninth 
parallel, US-Blackfoot tribal relations, 
whether good or bad, would have already been 
in place. But that was not the case. It was not 
addressed because the federal mandate in 1851 
concerned only those tribes and lands south of 
the Missouri and north of Texas and New 
Mexico. Rather, it was left to future agree-
ments to establish federal relations, to say 
nothing of peace, in the vast buffalo commons 
between the Missouri River and the Canadian 
border, east of the continental divide. 
Besides failing to have provided the proper 
purview, the Treaty of Laramie had not even 
lived up to its own promises, as Governor 
Stevens himself was quick to point out. 
"Tribes, parties to the Treaty of Laramie," 
Stevens related, "are now at open war with 
the Government, and the employment of four 
thousand troops, and an expenditure of, say, 
two million dollars is the price now being paid 
by the Government for the management of 
the Indian, in a comparatively small portion 
of the jurisdiction of the western superinten-
dency."24 
The situation in 1855 on the Northern 
Plains was somewhat analogous to the pre-
Laramie-treaty conditions. Land sales were not 
called for and tribal territories prior to both 
treaties remained largely undefined, with the 
tribes migrating, mingling, fighting, and com-
peting in what appeared to be a chaotic free-
for-alL Yet the differences were significant. 
New initiatives were clearly needed. From the 
perspective of the Indian Office in Washing-
ton, D.C., and of treaty commissioners like 
Stevens and Cumming, the major difference 
was that they now recognized all too well that 
war had to be prevented. Military solutions 
were too expensive. A more economical an-
swer had to be found-even if that meant 
greater concessions. 
It was unlikely that a treaty consistent with 
the newly emergent reservation policy could 
be concluded with the militarily powerful 
Blackfeet, Crow, Gros Ventre, and Assini-
boine. These nomadic hunters had been un-
willing to sell their land. It was doubtful 
whether they would compromise their free-
dom by acquiescing to definite boundaries-
to being penned in-or to a white-brokered 
peace. Concessions would have to be negoti-
ated with the tribes in the form of increased 
annuities, greater recognition of home terri-
tories, and more support for federal aid in the 
form of agencies, schools, missions, shops, 
hospitals, and yearly presents of useful goods 
and provisions. There needed to be some-
thing akin to a reservation treaty with an 
expanded agency plant, but one that would 
retain significant regional freedoms appro-
priate to a nomadic, buffalo-hunting people. 
Another consideration pushing innovation 
was the promises Stevens had made on the 
part of the government at Walla Walla and 
Hellgate to ensure the continued right of the 
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Western Indians to "go to buffalo," in other 
words, for the various bands and intertribal 
alliances to access the rich buffalo hunting 
ground they had shared in war and in peace 
across the Rocky Mountains. 
Innovation may have been needed at the 
Blackfoot Council, but the portents were not 
auspicious. Contention between Governor 
Stevens, whom the Blackfeet called "Short 
Man," and his equally strong-minded co-com-
missioner, Colonel Cumming, reigned from 
the beginning.25 Only with difficulty could they 
agree upon anything, certainly anything hav-
ing to do with their respective official respon-
sibilities, logistical support, or levels of treaty 
compensation. The official bickering contin-
ued over the character of the Blackfeet and 
the essential nature of the country they occu-
pied. It was a surprise, then, to have both com-
missioners agree upon a rough determination 
of Blackfoot and Crow tribal boundaries, ones 
significantly different from those set down at 
Laramie. It was even more astonishing to have 
them issue a joint determination to designate 
a "common hunting ground" along the lines 
Stevens had already acknowledged and ex-
plored at Walla Walla and Hellgate. 26 
Their proposed solution was to formally 
define, by way of natural landmarks and geo-
metric lines, a buffalo commons south of the 
Missouri, north of the Yellowstone, and east 
of the Continental Divide. This was arguably 
one of the richest, most contested game are-
nas of the Northern Plains. In doing so they 
clearly overturned and redrew the tribal 
boundaries contained in the 1851 Laramie 
accords. More creative and imaginative yet 
was the insistence that in this "open" arrange-
ment, the subscribing tribes 
should all live in peace, stay home when 
not hunting or trading and that the 
Blackfeet collectively should agree and con-
sent that what had been defined as Blackfeet 
territory in the Laramie Treaty of 1851 
should become a common hunting ground 
for 99 years where all the signers, east and 
west, shall enjoy equal privilegesY 
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Article III of the eventual treaty had the 
Blackfoot Nation as a whole consenting and 
agreeing 
that all that portion of the country recog-
nized and defined by the Treaty of Laramie 
as Blackfoot territory, lying within lines 
drawn from the Hell Gate or Medicine Rock 
Passes in the main range of the Rocky 
Mountains, in an easterly direction to the 
nearest source of the Muscle Shell River, 
thence to the mouth of Twenty-five Yard 
Creek, thence up the Yellowstone River to 
its northern source, and thence along the 
main range of the Rocky Mountains, in a 
northerly direction to the point of begin-
ning, shall be a common hunting ground 
for ninety-nine years, where all the nations, 
tribes and bands of Indians, parties to this 
treaty, may enjoy equal and uninterrupted 
privileges of hunting, fishing and gathering 
fruit, grazing animals, curing meat and dress-
ing robes. 
This common hunting ground did not con-
form or agree with the boundaries of what 
Laramie had erroneously described as "Black-
foot Territory."28 
The Blackfoot treaty proposals in fact de-
fined the lands between the Missouri and the 
Yellowstone Rivers correctly for the first time. 
Use of the territory in question did not belong 
exclusively to the Blackfeet, however defined, 
nor did they overwhelmingly and convincingly 
occupy it, possessing it in the sense of control-
ling either the sweeping grasslands themselves 
or access to them. This had been and would 
remain something of a war zone-contested, 
neutral, and therefore common ground on 
which the competing and always moving tribes 
shifted about like chess pieces as they wished 
or dared. 
Through their deliberate actions and di-
plomacy, the nomadic camps and alliances had 
created a territory that was controlled by none 
but hunted and used by all at various times in 
the ebb and flow of tribal movements. The 
Blackfoot tribes, for example, usually wintered 
near the mountains, along the Marias, Two 
Medicine, Belly, and Oldman Rivers. In late 
spring, with the return of the green grass, many 
of them moved east into the area immediately 
west of the Cypress Hills. If the buffalo were 
scarce in that quarter, they might decisively 
move farther east, skirting around the Cypress 
Hills. But if their scouts determined that the 
Gros Ventre or Assiniboine were in that area, 
they stayed away. Likewise, the Kootenai and 
Salish would often slip over the mountains to 
move in behind the Blackfeet after they had 
left their wintering grounds for the high plains 
in May. They would take their chances in what 
they hoped would be vacant land. On still 
other occasions the tribes asked permission to 
hunt, relied on adopted relations, or negoti-
ated a temporary peace between local bands. 29 
The common hunting ground was not un-
visited or uninhabited land. It was not an 
empty land, as has been portrayed by Paul 
Martin and Christine Szuter for an earlier pe-
riod, although at any given time it may have 
looked like one.30 Nor was this arena just a 
war zone. Numerous times the martial web 
traced by the comings and goings of war par-
ties and horse raiders collapsed. Temporary 
treaties and awkward truces were forged, after 
which carefree hunting, peaceful socializing, 
and intertribal trade reigned. Stevens recog-
nized this fundamental fact of tribal reality 
and, together with Cumming, designated and 
described the territory for what it was-a com-
mon hunting ground founded upon multiple 
tribal movement and multiple use. 
Such places and practices, while seldom 
exact, were not uncommon.3l These often sur-
faced without design, as terrain became more 
or less neutral, more or less dangerous, and 
particularly if it was geographically large, 
poorly defined, or only sporadically defended. 
Sometimes they cropped up as buffer zones 
between or within shifting tribal occupations. 
In other cases, there were conscious efforts to 
establish neutral zones or common hunting 
grounds. So, for example, following the 
Laramie Treaty of 1851, the Crow and the 
Miniconjou Sioux, for their mutual benefit, 
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FIG. 7. Map of the area between the Missouri and Arkansas Rivers and northwestward to the Columbia River 
showing various Indian tribes, to Col. D. D. Mitchell by P -J. DeSmet, S.]., 1851. Records of the Department of 
Interior, Office of Indian Affairs , RO 75, Map No . 251. Courtesy of the Mansfield Library, University of 
Montana 040501851 .US. 
agreed to share and use jointly the seam of 
territory between their Laramie-designated 
boundaries. Referred to as the "Neutral 
Grounds," age-old enmities were set aside in 
order to enjoy the benefits of safe hunting and 
of passage through each other's territory to 
expand trading opportunities.32 
Then, too, there were sacred places such as 
Medicine Mountain, where a shared common 
spiritual purpose created a zone of neutrality. 
In such terrain hostilities and bloodshed were 
to be set aside. Otherwise the sacred character 
of the immediate landscape would be violated 
to the detriment of the offender.33 In other 
cases fur trade posts functioned as a form of 
common or neutral ground where band or 
tribal entities momentarily set aside or inter-
rupted current animOSIties in the pursuit of 
mutual self-interest. For Indian peoples that 
interest could be access to Euro-American 
trade goods or the goodwill or gifts of the fur 
traders in charge who desired to foster re-
gional peace, so necessary for success. Advan-
tages and disadvantages were weighed and 
m'inutely calculated on the part of the bands 
and communities. Traders used their posts as 
neutral sanctuaries as they sought to broker or 
mediate peace. 34 Sometimes common ground 
emerged along river or mountain corridors, 
avenues of passage that could not be avoided 
and were therefore unavoidably shared. As 
with the buffalo commons, it was common 
only in the sense that these corridors were 
used by all, at different times, but alertly, 
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quickly, and preferably in large numbers. The 
Blackfoot treaty provision for a common hunt-
ing ground or a buffalo commons was not a 
concept foreign to tribal experience. 
Moreover, almost any landscape, even those 
thought of as specific to a single tribe, could 
regularly be penetrated or subject to shared 
expedient use. This did not mean the Indian 
tribes would take regular turns using this land 
and exploiting its resources. It did not mean 
there would be orderly spheres of influence or 
a free-for-all in which the strongest prevailed. 
And while Stevens and Cumming did not use 
the term "common" to qualify the privileges 
they described in the common hunting ground 
provision, they did insert "common" in the 
identifying label of the Indians' destination-
"the common hunting ground." In the opin-
ion of the commissioners, in order for this 
hunting ground to be durable and truly com-
mon, peace among the tribes would have to 
prevail. 35 From the time of Walla Walia, 
Stevens had proclaimed, "My heart said peace 
in the buffalo country, peace here, peace is 
here now, peace between yourselves, peace 
between US."36 
Over and against this n'ow designated and 
delineated common hunting ground, the 
Blackfoot Treaty in Article IV called for a 
Blackfoot reservation of territory within the 
United States that was to be theirs alone. 
Neither this land nor its resources were to be 
shared or held in common with any other tribe. 
In the parlance of the new reservation policy, 
which Stevens was anxious to adopt, if not 
actually replicate, this land was to be exclu-
sively theirs-"excepting as may be otherwise 
provided in this treaty." There were two stipu-
lations that did provide otherwise. The first 
was the establishment of a ten-mile buffer 
zone or neutral or demilitarized strip that ran 
north of the common hunting ground bound-
ary and parallel to the Musselshell from its 
source to its mouth on the Missouri River. 
Within this ten-mile zone there could be no 
permanent villages and the Blackfeet would 
not have or exercise "any exclusive rights."3? 
They had given to the Western Indians the 
right or liberty to hunt on the trail down the 
Musselshell. 
The second provision created an additional 
common hunting ground on the eastern edge 
of the Blackfoot territory where it abutted the 
country of the Assiniboine. 
Provided also, that the Assiniboines shall 
have the right of hunting, in common with 
the Blackfeet, in the country lying between 
the aforesaid eastern boundary, running 
from the mouth of the Milk River to the 
forty-ninth parallel, and a line drawn from 
the left bank of the Missouri River, oppo-
site the Round Butte north, to the forty-
ninth parallel. 38 
So, the Blackfoot Treaty recognized not just 
one preexisting common hunting ground but 
two. Yet of the two, it is the one with the 
Indians to the west, across the Rocky Moun-
tains, that dominated the Blackfoot Council 
discussions. Objections immediately came 
from the Western tribes and not from the 
Assiniboine, who, although a party to the 
treaty, were not present. These objections re-
veal much about the character of the tribal 
links to the bison grounds both inside and 
outside of the treaty-designated common hunt-
ing ground. 
Alexander, the Pend d'Oreille chief who 
had been so effective in the Hellgate Treaty 
negotiations, bitterly protested the restricted 
routes over the divide to the buffalo, as well as 
the proposed limitation to hunt only within 
the common hunting ground. "A long time 
ago our people, our ancestors, belonged in this 
country ... around the Three Buttes," he said, 
meaning the Sweetgrass Hills on the Cana-
dian border, smack in the middle of Blackfoot 
country. "We had many people on this side of 
the mountains. When my father was living he 
told me that was an old road for our people."39 
His second criticism was not unlike that which 
he had made at the Hellgate negotiation: 
We Indians were all well pleased when we 
came together here in friendship. Now you 
point us out a little piece of land to hunt 
our game in. When we were enemies I al-
ways crossed over there, and why should I 
not now when we are friends .... Which 
of these chiefs [pointing to the Blackfeet] 
says we are not to go there? Which is the 
one?40 
Little Dog allowed that he had raised the is-
sue, not because he wanted to be unfriendly 
but because "the North Blackfeet might make 
a quarrel if you hunted near them. Do not put 
yourself in their way."41 Such sparring was a 
further reminder that each band, to say noth-
ing of the various tribal elements in the 
Blackfoot confederacy, acted independently 
and that the whole of the country was at times 
a "war zone," although it was penetrable un-
der the right circumstances and therefore part 
of the Indian commons. 
Alexander would not let it drop. He wanted 
to continue travel to the buffalo hunting 
ground through the northern passes, those 
north of the treaty-sanctioned Hellgate Passes, 
by which he meant principally Marias and Cut 
Bank. "The Chief [Stevens] tells us that we 
are all, all of us Indians, to eat out of the 
same plate, one plate. Now you tell me to quit 
crossing in the North. I wonder how this can 
be?"42 Why were they, the Kootenai and the 
Pend d'Oreille, to say nothing of the others, 
to be restricted? Alexander's fellow tribesman 
Big Canoe concurred. He wanted no restric-
tions at all: "I thought our roads would be all 
over this country. Now you tell us different." 
Big Canoe must have been referring to how 
Stevens, as "soldier chief," had promised the 
Salishe and Kootenai government protection 
and help against the Blackfeet so that they 
could hunt buffalo east of the mountains. 
The implication had been, at least from their 
perspective, that they could hunt wherever 
they wanted. Big Canoe recognized the con-
sequences. "Supposing that we do stick to-
gether and do make a peace .... Now you tell 
me not to step over that way. I have a mind 
to go there."43 Both Big Canoe and Alexander 
had a point. Since their "common hunting 
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ground" included all Blackfoot territory south 
of the forty-ninth parallel, why should they 
agree to a limited and smaller commons, even 
with government guarantees? 
Given the vociferous objections, Little Dog, 
chief of the Black-Patched Moccasin band of 
the Piegans, retreated, saying "Since he 
[Alexander} speaks so much of it, we will give 
him liberty to come out in the North."44 Com-
missioner Cumming, using a map, tried to 
make Alexander understand that the whole of 
the territory had been designated as belong-
ing to the Blackfeet at the Fort Laramie Treaty 
and that the commissioners were now being 
most generous in transforming the southern 
portion into a federally broke red "common 
hunting ground." Stevens chimed in with an-
other rationale: 
In making this division we looked to the 
Indians obtaining their living. The West-
ern Indians have enough in the piece given 
them in proportion to their numbers .... 
The Western Indians are only one fourth as 
numerous as the Blackfeet. Let Alexander 
think of this. He does not get all his food 
from the Buffalo. He has farms and cattle. 
The Blackfeet have none. 45 (Stevens 
thought the Blackfeet to number in excess 
of 11,000.) 
Finally, the Piegan Chief Lame Bull, also 
called Nee-ti-nee or "The Only Chief," re-
minded everyone in attendance, especially the 
Salish and Nez Perce so proud of their 
longstanding friendship with the whites, that 
it was not the Blackfeet who had sought out 
this treaty nor had they written it. 
It is not our plan that these things are going 
on. I understood that what the White 
Chiefs told us to do, we were to do both 
sides. It is not we who speak. It is the White 
Chiefs. Look at those tribes (pointing to 
the Western Indians), they are the first to 
speak, making objections this morning. We 
intend to do whatever the Government 
tells US. 46 
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Stevens should have anticipated these 
Salish and Nez Perce concerns. Anything that 
altered the subsistence round generated anxi-
ety, especially changes in the way the bands 
hunted buffalo. However reasonable from the 
government's perspective, the geographical 
limitations, the restriction on their liberty to 
go where they wanted or dared, as represented 
by designated common or exclusive ~pheres, 
was a palpable sacrifice. It was like a big-city 
politician gerrymandering voting districts to 
suit his own self-interest. The federal govern-
ment was attempting to engineer a precisely 
drawn new world order, to reshape use-rights 
in an Indian-created buffalo commons, and 
the Pend d'Oreille did not like it. The Nez 
Perce and Flathead probably did not like the 
situation either, but there is no record that 
they objected. More likely, they decided to 
save their words and do what they wanted, as 
they always had. If the treaty could replace a 
war-zone commons with a peaceful, govern-
ment-designated, common hunting ground 
that offered better hunting and other advan-
tages, they could reconsider. The key issue 
was the condition of peace. Although limited 
and circumscribed, a peaceful commons might 
be truly preferable to the larger commons 
where warfare was a constant. The Salish verb 
for "going to war" meant "stealing horses." In 
the new peace of the federal common hunting 
ground, the Blackfeet duly promised the Salish 
"they would go home on as good horses as they 
came on."47 Possibly there were advantages to 
peace. 
But what if the buffalo were uncooperative 
and would not stay put in the common hunt-
ing ground? What if the buffalo could not be 
found in sufficient numbers within the desig-
nated "lines," as was the case that very year, 
1855? The tribal parties from west across the 
mountains had just experienced real want, if 
not actual starvation, as they assembled in or 
near what would be named the common hunt-
ing ground, preparatory to the council. Severe 
drought dominated in every direction. Bison 
had not been seen in the Musselshell country 
for over six weeks. Grass was so scarce that the 
Flathead and the Nez Perce resorted to felling 
cottonwood trees along the small watercourses 
to feed their horse herds.48 Farther south, other 
Nez Perce hunting parties, finding "few buf-
falo and small game scarce," split up, with some 
traveling as far south and east as below the 
confluence of the Big Horn and Yellowstone 
Rivers into Crow country.49 As for the Black-
feet themselves, Bad Head, or "Father of Many 
Children" as he was known when he signed 
the Judith Treaty, designated 1854 in his win-
ter count as "Itaomitaohoyop," or "when we 
ate dogs"-a disastrous condition. 50 
Bison were mysterious animals. 51 Their lo-
cation and movement were never to be taken 
for granted. Frequently they seemed propelled 
by spirits or offended by humans; they were 
subject to various levels of hunting pressure, 
to weather and climate changes, to grass fires 
and blackened prairies, to changes in winter 
forage, and who knew to what else. If buffalo 
were not presently to be found in the common 
hunting ground, when would they return? If 
they drifted on and off a particular and bounded 
landscape willy-nilly, what logic was there to 
restricting tribal hunting to a limited and par-
ticular tract of land, especially one so small 
and restricted? 
Stevens and Cumming could be rather cava-
lier about buffalo hunting. Along with a good 
many others, they did not believe that either 
buffalo or Indian buffalo hunting had a bright 
future. In his preamble to the treaty, even 
before the various articles were read and trans-
lated, Stevens had set out the government's 
hope and vision for the future. 
We want to establish you in your country 
on farms. We want you to have cattle and 
raise crops. We want your children to be 
taught, and we want you to send word to 
your Great Father, through us where you 
want your farms to be .... This country is 
your home. It will remain your home. And 
as I told the Western Indians we hoped ... 
the Blackfeet would not live on poor Buf-
falo Meat but would have domestic Cattle 
for food. We want them to have Cattle. 
You know the Buffalo will not continue 
forever. Get farms and cattle in timeY 
Indians were not so sure. The Blackfeet had 
indeed complained that "the buffalo are not as 
plenty as formerly, we have to eat too many 
old bulls. "53 And in 1851 an Assiniboine chief, 
The Bear, lamented to Father DeSmet, "I see 
the buffaloes decrease every year. "54 Bad Head's 
winter count for 1854 graphically reinforced 
this perception. Yet not all Blackfeet or oth-
ers were convinced that the losses were irre-
versible. After all, even amid the general lack 
of buffalo numbers in the drought-stricken 
summer of 1855, Stevens had reported large 
counts between the Marias and the Milk River. 
Maybe the bison would return in some equally 
mysterious way. It was an open question. 55 
Stevens hammered away on this point-
the buffalo cannot subsist forever. Whatever 
Stevens's sincerity, he was not alone. A de-
cline in bison numbers had become a general-
ized prediction since the 1840s.56 The idea of 
the disappearance of the buffalo as a major 
source of Indian subsistence sometime in the 
future was not confined to federal authorities 
or missionaries pushing a pacific or agricul-
tural agenda or hoping to establish a buffalo 
commons in an effort to ease an Indian transi-
tion to civilization. With considerable sarcasm 
the writer of the Fort Benton Journal, in Sep-
tember 1855, advised visiting native hunters: 
"[Glo to it while you are young for when you 
'get old' you will have no buffalo to kill as 
Gov. Stevens' railroad hands will consume 
them all."57 
Times were troubled and difficult, for not 
only were bison numbers in decline, tribal 
populations were as well. Smallpox had rav-
aged the Blackfeet, the Blood and the Piegan 
with particular intensity in 1837. The journal 
of Lieutenant Bradley, relying on informa-
tion from Alexander Culbertson, reported 
that "among these three tribes not less than 
six thousand perished, or about two-thirds of 
their whole number-the very flower of the 
tribes." Father Nicolas Point, writing a decade 
later, concurred observing that the Blackfeet, 
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FIG. 8. "Ne-tannay, The Only Chief' or "Stam-
yekh-sas-ci-cay, Lame Bull," Piegan Chief, 8 October 
1855. Drawing by Gustavus Sohon. Courtesy of 
Washington State Historical Society , Tacoma. 
previously so numerous, had experienced an 
alarming drop in numbers and had not recov-
ered. "War, intoxicating liquor, small pox and 
similar gifts presented to the people by the 
white man," had reduced them, Point said, to 
"a' third of what they had been a quarter of a 
century before."58 The September 1853 report 
of Blackfeet agent Alfred). Vaughan also re-
ported "recurring waves of smallpox, measles, 
and cholera, causing population losses."59 The 
consequences of this level of depopulation and 
the continuing threat of epidemics altered 
band sizes, marriage patterns, hunting strate-
gies, as well as alliances and political leader-
ship. 60 
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Blackfeet leaders groped in the changing 
circumstances of population loss, bison scar-
city or its threat, and the intensified intru-
sions of other tribes-Cree, Crow, Metis, and 
SiOUX.61 They willingly resorted to diplomacy, 
to treaties, to giving peace and diplomacy a 
chance-even if that meant confinement of a 
sort. 62 Hudson Bay Company officials reported 
that the Piegan, for instance, sent peace del-
egations to Edmonton in September 1855, 
where a Piegan-Cree peace treaty emerged. 
Later, fearful that the fragile peace would be 
broken, tribes made new efforts at concilia-
tion-this time to include wider involvement 
by more tribes of the Blackfeet Confederacy.63 
The Blackfeet seemed desperate for peace. 
Peace would allow them to replenish their 
numbers, to regain their equilibrium, and to 
secure their territories against the ever more 
aggressive assaults. Treaties are often signed 
when leaders see no other choice. In like 
fa.shion, the Metis, Sioux, and Chippewa 
reached "a great treaty of peace" in July 1858 
when they agreed that the Cheyenne River 
was to be a dividing or boundary line between 
their hunting territories. Should buffalo or 
game become scarce on either side, the tribes 
should "have the privilege of crossing over 
said dividing line ... and should be welcomed 
by said neighboring tribes." Indians did not 
need federal white brokers to establish "com-
mon hunting grounds."64 They did it them-
selves. 
On Wednesday, 17 October 1855, after 
lengthy discussions of what the Blackfeet were 
giving up "in their desire for peace and friend-
ship," especially in granting the Western In-
dians the liberty to hunt on the trail down the 
Musselshell to the Yellowstone, the Pend 
d'Oreille and others agreed to the new bound-
ary lines. 6s The Blackfeet Council thereby 
avoided what had promised to be another 
treaty stalemate, with bouts of acrimony and 
posturing. Once again, as at Walla Walla and 
Hellgate, Indian opposition in public to treaty 
proposals quickly, miraculously, inexplicably 
evaporated. When Commissioners Cumming 
and Stevens reconvened the great council at 
noon, the chiefs and headmen reviewed the 
tribal boundaries with "the aid of a map and a 
rough sketch of the country drawn on a buf-
falo skin." The written proceedings register 
only compliance. No objections were recorded; 
if there were any, they disappeared or were 
swallowed. 
In its final form the Blackfoot treaty con-
tained sixteen articles. In addition to Article 
III recognizing common hunting grounds with 
its three provisos and Article IV defining the 
territory over which the Blackfeet tribes would 
"exercise exclusive control," the most impor-
tant issue was how to get to the "common 
hunting ground." This was taken up in Article 
V. It provided detailed regulations limiting 
the entry points the Western tribes were to be 
confined to as they journeyed east. "They will 
not enter the common hunting ground, nor 
any part of the Blackfeet territory, or return 
home by any pass in the main range of the 
Rocky Mountains to the north of the Hell 
Gate or Medicine Rock Passes." This com-
ported with Stevens's assertion that the West-
ern Indians "use certain passes. The Medicine 
Rock, the Big Hole, and others further south." 
Article VI completed the treaty discussion 
of the common hunting ground by reminding 
the signers that, when not hunting in the com-
mon hunting ground or going to it or return-
ing from it, the tribes consented "to remain in 
their own respective countries, except ... when 
visiting each other for the purpose of trade or 
social intercourse." The reason for this, ex-
plained Commissioner Cumming, was "only 
to preserve their hunting grounds distinctly 
apart .... The whites make these lines to show 
where each must hunt so there shall be no 
quarrels. "66 
The remaining articles hollowed out or 
lopped off considerable elements of tribal 
independence. Although important to the 
commissioners, these losses were of little sig-
nificance to the Indian signers of the 1855 
treaty. After all, there was nothing terribly 
threatening or conspicuous about the conces-
sions demanded of the Indians by the govern-
ment. They would keep their lands or at least 
their rights to access the resources of those 
regions, and after all, that was all they had 
ever had. The chiefs and headmen of the bands 
and tribes would retain their conventional 
authority. If anything, that authority would 
be intensified and extended. Tribal leaders 
could see no danger of an imminent invasion 
of great numbers of whites such as the country 
to the south bordering the Oregon Trail had 
experienced. In all the territories held by the 
participating tribes at the council, white oc-
cupation was negligible. Nor was that expected 
to change. If there was an erosion of tribal 
authority and independence, it was insidious-
invisible to the stressed tribal leaders. 
In essence, there were two visions of the 
future represented at the council. The white 
one saw the inevitable decline of the buffalo, 
the continued, spiraling drop in Indian num-
bers, the coming of a general peace with the 
establishment of isolated and permanent In-
dian reservations, and a mixed but asymmetri-
cal Indian and white society amid the 
establishment of a transcontinental railroad 
and territorial growth. Opposing this was an 
Indian vision featuring very limited change, 
coupled with federal guarantees of continuity. 
Above all, this Indian perspective would al-
low for the continued but peaceful tribal mo-
bility across and within ceded lands and even 
beyond into a shared Indian landscape, the 
common hunting groundY Dogged persis-
tence, a willingness to engage in endless if 
intermittent skirmishes, and an irregular tribal 
diplomacy had created that situation histori-
cally. With federal help this older Indian com-
mons could be reshaped, limited, redefined, 
and blessed with peace. The implications of 
such actions in terms of either human or bison 
numbers were not formally considered. 
In return for the Indian concessions, the 
United States agreed to spend $20,000 annu-
ally for ten years on goods and provisions, the 
so-called annuities, for the tribes of the 
Blackfoot Nation. In that same period an ad-
ditional $15,000 would be spent annually on 
farms and agricultural instruction, in edu-
cating children, and "in any other respect 
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promoting their civilization and Christian-
ization." Bad Head's winter count reinforced 
the importance of the annuities and the 
changes they signified when he recorded that 
1855 was the year "when we were first paid."68 
After a theatrical and idealistic last presenta-
tion by Commissioner Cumming, the com-
missioners signed the treaty, according to the 
record kept, and were followed by the chiefs, 
headmen, and delegates. "Great satisfaction 
prevailed and every chief of any importance 
signed the treaty."69 
The Blackfoot agent Edwin A. C. Hatch 
leveled a more realistic assessment. Not long 
after Commissioners Cumming and Stevens 
had left to return to their posts, Hatch con-
fided to his diary 
A man arrived from the Yellowstone (Fort 
Union) last night with a letter dated Oct. 
7th. Sioux threaten to besiege Fort Clark-
so we here are between two fires, the Sioux 
below and the combined tribes west of us-
and we are quiet in the center of the most 
warlike and heretofore the most hostile 
tribes on the continent, vis. the Blackfeet. 70 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Although the collected Blackfeet had an-
ticipated a treaty of peace and amity to emerge 
from the Blackfoot Council, they were ini-
tially unprepared to bargain in land, which 
the common hunting ground provision re-
quired. By September, however, rumors began 
to emanate out of Forts Benton and Campbell 
on the Missouri indicating that something to 
do with territory was afoot. James Doty, secre-
ta~y for the Treaty Commission, while on the 
Bow River in early September attempting to 
drum up interest in the Blackfoot Council, 
was asked whether it was true that the 
Blackfeet would be asked to give up their lands 
and hunting grounds south of the Missouri 
River to "the Flatheads, Pend Oreilles and Nez 
Perce for a home." The story, Doty reported, 
was much discussed within the various camps, 
and although Doty did his best to allay their 
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fears, a number of leaders decided to stay 
away.7l If the headmen were not there, they 
reasoned, they could not be a part of any land 
transaction. Although the rumors and leaks 
did not get the details exactly right, the es-
sence of the message was accurate-the US 
government was going to give to the Western 
Indians, in recognition of their longstanding 
use, land east of the divide, and this would be 
done at the Blackfeet's expense. It may not 
have been the rumored "home," but it was 
close to it, a kind of home away from home, in 
the territory that had been previously assigned 
to the Blackfeet alone by the Fort Laramie 
Treaty. 
Although both Commissioners Stevens and 
Cumming had obviously agreed on the com-
mon hunting ground provision, Stevens ap-
pears, from the treaty discussions and promises 
made at Walla Walla and Hellgate, in addi-
tion to his 1854 map, to have had the concept 
of a common hunting ground in mind for some 
time-certainly more so than did either his 
colleague Cumming or the Indian Office in 
Washington, D.C. 
Further evidence for Stevens's principal 
responsibility for the common hunting ground 
designation can be found in the similarities 
between the treaty provisions of his Washing-
ton treaties and those in the Judith Treaty. 
The central feature of those earlier treaties 
was the establishment of a fixed and perma-
nent home-a reservation of a small portion 
of their former lands-that was to be exclu-
sively theirs. This policy had come out of the 
Indian Office under Luke Lea, Charles E. Mix, 
and George W. Manypenny. It did not repre-
sent Stevens's personal initiative. Stevens's 
contribution, however, did surface when he 
conceded to the Indians "rights of access to 
the open and unclaimed lands" they had just 
sold or ceded into the public domain. These 
rights to hunt, fish, and gather as they always 
had would now be exercised "in common" with 
the citizens of the territory. It was this key 
combination of Indian uses, exclusive and 
shared, that became the stamp of Stevens's 
innovative regional approach. 
By recognizing a public area in Washing-
ton Territory to be shared "in common" by 
Indian and white alike-until claimed by white 
colonizers-Stevens explored new ground. It 
was also a model that he thought could be 
adapted to the sprawling Indian commons or 
war zone that constituted the buffalo country 
of the Northern Plains beyond the continen-
tal divide. 
In line with his novel reservation policy, 
Stevens decided to acknowledge an exclusive 
territory for the American Blackfeet. Unlike 
the small parcels on Puget Sound, however, 
this reservation would closer resemble the 
pastoral examples of the Plateau, only bigger. 
In fact, the Blackfeet Territory could be huge. 
Whites were not clamoring for lands there and 
Congress could easily justify such a large res-
ervation as politically acceptable. Adjacent 
to this exclusive territory defined by the 
Blackfoot treaty, Stevens established, as in 
Washington Territory, a limited commons-
the "common hunting ground." It was defined 
as "open and unclaimed" and would be held 
"in common" for both the Blackfeet and the 
Western Indians. These on-reservation and 
off-reservation rights together formed a tidy 
package designed to resemble the new federal 
reservation policy enough to be reconcilable 
with it, and yet to dovetail with the customary 
buffalo hunting provisions of the treaties of 
Walla Walla and Hellgate. Promises had been 
made. Promises had been kept. 
Again, Stevens did not have to create a 
common hunting ground; all he had to do was 
to recognize its de facto existence, structure it 
by means of imposing boundaries and guaran-
tees, and define the nature and kinds of activi-
ties that would take place there. It would not 
be organic or dynamic as in former times. There 
would be an artifice to this federal creation it 
could not escape; its parentage was known. 
But this federal child, however limited, would 
permit the continuation of equestrian buffalo 
hunting for both the Blackfeet and the West-
ern Indians. In many respects the common 
hunting ground was a human and moral con-
cession to previous treaty commitments. It was 
also an expedient one on the part of a stingy 
government. 
Within the defined portion of the old con-
tested territory, Stevens determined to trans-
fer the essential intertribal peace of the west 
side of the Rockies, so often associated with 
the tribes of the Columbia Plateau, onto the 
east side, inhabited by warring Indians and, at 
the moment, sufficient bison. It was an engag-
ing territorial mission. There was no acknowl-
edgment, however, that peaceful common 
access would further deplete scarce game popu-
lations. Maintaining a healthy bison popula-
tion was not Stevens's goal; establishing peace 
was paramount. 
In retrospect, this formal creation of a de-
fined, limited, and structured "common hunt-
ing ground" amounted to a kind of federal 
seizure of the public domain prior to citizen-
ship or any actual land transfers. It was a legal 
"taking" as defined by the Fifth Amendment 
to the US Constitution, for it laid down regu-
lations and controls regarding which parties 
were to be included, how they were to con-
duct themselves (peacefully), proper uses of 
the resources available, and avenues of en-
try-to say nothing of determining how long 
the federal creation would exist. And while it 
may be argued there had been due process, 
there had not been fair compensation, or, for 
that matter, any compensation. If these stan-
dards applied to the property rights of citizens 
subject to a common good, didn't they also 
apply to dependent sovereigns? 
The treaty also envisioned for this com-
mon hunting ground a military presence in 
the form of forts and troops that would give 
the government an enforcement apparatus 
should it be needed. Finally, the creation of 
the common hunting ground was considered 
a temporary and expedient solution. It would 
meet immediate needs, buying time until a 
treaty of cession could be negotiated and a 
complete reservation policy effected. 
What the government needed was time to 
institute a full reservation effort at moderate 
expense, not to protect the declining buffalo 
resource. Whether the government's view rep-
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resented keen observation or simply the as-
sumptions associated with a political and cul-
tural agenda is almost beside the point. With 
the buffalo becoming increasingly scarce, the 
tribes would lose the incentives to undertake 
the long, difficult pilgrimages into either a 
peaceful buffalo commons or hostile territory 
and thus would remain in their home orbits. 
That would not only be to their advantage but 
would relieve some of the hunting pressure on 
those unpredictable pockets of bison that re-
mained on the Northern Plains. On the other 
hand, if the tribes were determined to con-
tinue to go to buffalo, Stevens felt they needed 
to avoid the persistent and debilitating tribal 
altercations formerly attendant upon bison 
hunting. Otherwise, the martial ethos now so 
disruptive to the government plans for terri-
torial development would persist as long as 
the buffalo. 
The trick was to keep the common hunting 
ground viable long enough to accomplish the 
tribal passage from a hunting and foraging 
culture to one of "civilization" and agricul-
ture. This was no easy task. Persistent fear of 
attack and staggering war losses, deadly dis-
ease pathogens, and liquor had imposed in the 
earlier contested commons informal, but very 
real, limits to tribal buffalo hunting. Once 
those obstacles were lessened, would hunters 
from all sides converge onto the buffalo com-
mons, both old and new, where peace was now 
so encouraging? Would implosion occur?72 The 
answers to these questions dealt not only with 
the perception of bison numbers and locations 
but with the Indians themselves. Many whites 
were just as convinced that the Indians were 
disappearing, although it was never clear to 
nineteenth-century observers whether it was 
the Indian population or their culture that 
was vanishing, or both. Still, these were paral-
lel trends, and in the minds of many, their 
convergence would make the ninety-nine-year 
life span of the common hunting ground suffi-
ciently long. Then, too, the federal military 
presence would constitute a regulating mecha-
nism on the movement of the tribes or on the 
exploitation of bison resources. If that were 
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not enough, a fully implemented and success-
ful reservation policy would provide the means 
and the social pressure for the tribes to stay 
home. 
Together, these constraints in the minds of 
the commissioners would be enough to ensure 
the continuing presence of the buffalo and the 
vitality of the common hunting ground-at 
least in the short term. As early as 1839 the 
Indian and the buffalo had been described as 
"Siamese twins" who would perish together. 73 
We know the analogy was wrong. Stevens, 
however, would not take a chance. He sought 
to separate the twins, weaning the buffalo In-
dians from the nomadic life and substituting 
in its place reservations, stock, and agricul-
ture. But that would take time. If the western 
tribes and the bison did not perish together, 
certainly they would negotiate together the 
inevitable transition that time would bring. 
Meanwhile, the common hunting ground was 
th:e government's safety valve, for it would 
relieve economic pressure to support the tran-
sition. If the buffalo and Indians should some-
how unexpectedly survive in the common 
hunting ground, then the ninety-nine-year 
lease would run out. In fact, the federal com-
mon hunting ground was negotiated out of 
existence within ten years and the buffalo were 
all but gone in thirty. Yet in concept, the com-
mon hunting ground was an experiment-an 
ameliorating one, given government parsi-
mony-and a necessary if temporary stage in 
the Indians' hope for survivaL 
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